!DOWNLOAD EPUB ♖ The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 ☪ PDF or E-pub free

!DOWNLOAD EPUB ♚ The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 ⚇ Arab Cold War Wikipedia The Arab Cold War Arabic Al Harb Al Arabbiyah Al B Rdah Was A Period Of Political Rivalry In The Arab World That Occurred As Part Of The Broader Cold War Between, Approximately, The Egyptian Revolution Ofthat Brought President Gamal Abdel Nasser To Power In That Country, And TheIranian Revolution Which Led Arab Iranian Tensions To Eclipse Intra Arab StrifeThe Arab Cold War A Study InNotRetrouvez The Arab Cold War A Study In Ideology In Politics Et Des Millions De Livres En Stock SurAchetez Neuf Ou D Occasion Beyond The Arab Cold War The International History Beyond The Arab Cold War Brings The Yemen Civil War,, To The Forefront Of Modern Middle East History During The S, In The Wake Of A Coup Against Imam Muhammad Al Badr And The Formation Of The Yemen Arab Republic YAR , Yemen Was Transformed Into An Arena Of Global Conflict Believing Al Badr To Be Dead, Egypt, The Soviet Union, And Most Countries Recognized The YAR But When Al Badr The New Arab Cold War Rediscovering The Arab By Rediscovering The Arab Cold War Of Thes And By Drawing Attention To The Transformation Of Arab Nationalism And The Importance Of New Trans Arab Media, The New Arab Cold War Perspective Aims At Supplementing Rather That Supplanting The Prominent Moderate Radical, Sectarian And Realist Westphalian Narratives By Highlighting Dimensions Of Both Continuity And Change It Does The Arab Cold War,edition Open The Arab Cold War, A Study Of Ideology In Politics Nd Edition By Malcolm H Kerr Publishedby Issued Under The Auspices Of The Royal Institute Of International Affairs By Oxford UP In London, New York EtcThe Arab Cold War WEEKCourserawas Therefore The End Of The Arab Cold War And The End Of An Era Both The So Called Progressives And The So Called Reactionaries Were All In The Same Boat, Having Been Defeated Equally By Israel And The Previous Ideological Divisions Became Irrelevant Pan Arab Ism, So Popular Before , Was Now A Defeated Force And The Vacuum Left By Pan Arabs Was Filled By The New Challenge Of An incredible work that anyone interested in understanding the Middle East and the interlocking relationship between the major Arabs states needs to read. Its well sourced, well documented, easily digestible and extremely insightful. Dense, but extremely useful and trustworthy account of what the Middle East looked like from an Arab world perspective. I Think there are some gaps in this book A Great summary of that tumultuous era in Arab affairs, written (in its last updated version) in 1971, right after Nasser's death which was the end of an era. klhl

this is a pretty outstanding study as far as diplomatic history goes. The Empty Room

First, be sure you have the 3rd and final edition of this book, as it is only in the last section added after 1967 where the politics and the implications get truly interesting. The first 5 1/2 chapters can be summarized as great sound and fury, signifying nothing. Kerr's analysis of Nasser's foreign policy and interArab relations reads as a soap opera of misplaced egos and revolving actors all jockeying for a place in the limelight of a theater where the audience has gone home. The basis for Arab unity were the twin forces of panArabism based on common language and panIslamism based on common religion, a United States of Arabia but divided by ethnicity and geography where even the principle players knew very little each of others' people or situation. On one side were various clan based monarchies who guarded their independence but did get along with each other whereas the other side consisted of revolutionary dictatorships who barely understood their own politics let alone anyone else's. Superficially unity sounded like a good idea at the time.

Its a fair description of the politics of the day and why attempts at unity such as the UAR fell apart, but Kerr is rather soft on Nasser's adventurism in Yemen preferring to focus on EgyptianSaudi rivalry instead of Yemen itself. The impact of panIslamism and its suppression in Egypt and Jordan, a very different creature then from today's highly radicalized manifestations but still interesting, is barely touched upon, however Kerr does select a suitably revealing statement that shows the large gap between secularized elites and the general population when he quotes the unnamed Iraqi Minister for Unity Affairs on page 123: “To some groups socialism might mean social justice while to others it meant Marxist socialism involving all the forces of production and trade... What (the masses) believe in is their religion, which, certainly has nothing in common with pure Marxist ideologies.”

Surprisingly Kerr also has very little to say specifically about the aftermath of Arab losses of 6 day war. Their balloons popped, there was literally no prestige or honour left to trade on, and though both King Husayn of Jordan (Kerr's spelling) and Nasser had lost territory, surprisingly both managed to hold on to power. General Arif was driven out of power in Iraq in mid 1968, replaced by the return of Ahmad Hassan and his Ba'thists, and Hafiz Assad seizes power in November 1970 to become the first long term ruler over Syria since WW II. The important story is the events of Black September. For years King Husayn had tolerated , even supported, the presence of Palestinian militants on Jordanian soil, allowed, within limits, to conduct a limited campaign against Israel, as did Nasser's regime in Egypt.

According to Kerr, by 1970 the Palestinian fedayin had become too arrogant, driving around Amman in jeeps displaying loaded weapons, ignoring routine checkpoints and traffic controls and openly extorting funds from locals and foreign residents both in public and their homes. In June the PFLP seized two hotels and held the European and American guests hostage demanding that the King change some of the government's political appointees as random. Then in early September they had hijacked 4 planes and held them and the passengers hostage, three of the planes on the ground near Zarqa, only 20 miles from the royal palace. On the 16th Husayn appointed a new government consisting of loyalists and on the next day his Bedouin troops began a country wide assault on Palestinian strongholds. (Kerr fails to mention that there were several failed assassination attempts on the King. He does mention the humiliating Oct 13 Ladgham Commission recommendation that would have recognized Arafat effectively as coruler of Jordan with the right to separately tax and conscript his own army within the country) Husayn's actions were widely condemned but condemnation did not result in concrete support, including from the 2030K Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan. The brutality of the Arab civil war had residents of the west bank wondering if they were not better off under Israel and for many Israelis it confirmed what might be their fate should the Arabs ever prevail in a war. Nasser died in the middle of these events on Sept 28th, many would say of a broken heart, his life long attempts at creating a unified Arab front under his control shattered by reality.

Kerr, who was assassinated in 1984 by proIranian militants, was absolutely correct in labeling Arab rivalry as another "Cold War". Arab unity failed because the perceived commonalities were far less important than power politics and local identity.